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Abstract
We examine the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of
essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the variety offered by a downstream
industry, as well as on consumers and social welfare. When an upstream monopoly
owner of essential IP increases the number of licenses, it enhances product variety,
adding to consumer value, but it also intensifies downstream competition, and thus
dissipates profits. As a result, the upstream IP monopoly may want to provide too
many or too few licenses, relatively to what maximizes consumer surplus or social
welfare.
With multiple owners of essential IP, royalty stacking increases aggregate licensing
fees and thus tends to limit the number of licensees, which can also reduce downstream
prices for consumers. We characterize the conditions under which these reductions
in downstream prices and variety is beneficial to consumers or society.
Keywords: Intellectual property, licensing policy, vertical integration, patent
pools.
JEL Classification Numbers: L4,L5,O3
1 Introduction
In many high technology industries, the development of any new product or service
often involves hundreds and thousands of patents. Of particular concern is the so-
called patent thicket problem,1 where independent licensing policies by the owners of
complementary intellectual property may give rise to royalty stacking — a “horizontal”
form of the double marginalization problem identified by Cournot (1838)2 — and result
in prohibitively high licensing fees. This patent thicket problem is often presented as
a compelling rationale for significant reform of the patent system and/or licensing
policies,3 and has led competition authorities to apply “abuse of dominance” laws in
order to reduce licensing fees.4
This patent thicket issue is particularly problematic when it involves many patent
1See e.g. Shapiro (2001) for further discussion. Empirical studies of the effects of patent thickets
include Heller and Eisenberg (1998), Kiley (1992) and Kitch (2003) in bio-medical research, and
Geradin, Layne-Farrar, and Padilla (2007), Schankerman and Noel (2006), Walsh, Arora and Cohen
(2003) and Ziedonis (2003) in technology intensive industries.
There is a related literature analyzing hold-up problems in standard setting and joint licensing
agreements. See Shapiro (2010), Lichtman (2006), Lemley and Shapiro (2007). See also Farrell et
al. (2007) for a comprehensive discussion.
2Such double marginalization problems arise whenever complementary inputs are involved; fol-
lowing Schmidt (2008), the “horizontal” form refers to situations where the inputs are bought by the
same customer (e.g., when a product developer needs several pieces of IP), whereas the “vertical”
form arises when the inputs involve different stages of a vertical chain (e.g., when a consumer buys
from a retailer, who in turn buys from a manufacturer; addressing the consumer needs thus requires
both “production” and “distribution” services).
3See for example SCM v Xerox: Paper Blizzard for $1.8 Billion," New York
Times, June 27, 1977. As technology has become increasingly complex, this con-
cern has drawn both judicial and legislative scrutiny — see Business Week Online
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_20/b4034049.htm (May 14, 2007) and
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/may2007/sb20070523_462426.htm (May 23,
2007), as well as http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca28_berman/berman_patent_bill.pdf
and http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=427.
For opposing views, see for example Geradin, Layne-Farrar, and Padilla (2007), who argue that
the theoretical conclusion lacks empirical support. Elhauge (2008) argues that previous analyses
tend to start with too low a benchmark for royalties and that other factors can offset the adverse
effects (if any) of patent thickets on royalties.
4For example, in July 2007 the European Commission sent Rambus a Statement of Objections,
stating that Rambus may have infringed then Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now Article 102) by
abusing a dominant position in the market for DRAMs. After eighteen months of procedure, in
December 2009 the European Commission accepted Rambus’ offer — making it a binding commitment
— to put a five-year worldwide cap on its royalty rates for products compliant with the standards
set by the Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC).
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holders. In practice, however, the reality is often not of thousands of patent owners,
but of thousands of patents with a few owners; moreover, patents are often licensed
in groups and not individually.5 To be sure, even a few patent owners will tend to
set royalties which in aggregate exceed monopoly levels, when acting independently.
This type of double marginalization can result in excessive royalties from the patent
owners’ standpoint and tends to reduce the number of firms in the product market.
When only prices matter in that market, this reduction in competition unambiguously
harms consumers and society. The impact is less clear when variety matters; as some of
the customers buying from a new entrant are switching away from rivals, the revenue
they generate may exceed the social value created by entry. Excessive entry can
involve inefficient duplication of fixed costs, and the resulting market segmentation
can lead to higher prices that hurt consumers as well as reduce social welfare.6 In
such situations royalty stacking can have beneficial effects.
To see this, consider the case of an essential intellectual property (IP hereafter),
which is necessary for competing in a product market. If the IP owners can jointly
determine the number of licenses and appropriate the resulting profits, they will
choose the number of licenses so as to maximize industry profits. In some markets,
this may lead them to restrict entry, compared to what would be socially desirable;
in such a case royalty stacking, which further restricts entry, hurts consumers as well
as society. But in other markets, industry profit maximization may instead generate
more entry than is socially desirable — implying that consumers would benefit from
restricting entry.7 Royalty stacking then comes as a blessing, by counterbalancing the
The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had similarly ordered Rambus to reduce its licensing
rates on the basis of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (monopolization) and of Section 5 of the FTC
Act (unfair competition) — see the FTC Final order and Opinion of 2 February 2007 in Docket No.
9302. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia repelled the order, and the US
Supreme Court denied to review this ruling, which led the FTC to abandon the complaint.
5Goodman and Myers (2005) break down the composition of portfolios for the patents declared
essential to 3G PP2 technology; they find that the largest IP holder owns approximately 65% of these
patents, and that the three largest portfolios account for 80% of the total number. Parchomovsky
and Wagner (2005) stress the importance of patent portfolios over individual patents.
6For conditions under which there can be excessive or insufficient entry, see for example Lancaster
(1975), Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Vickrey (1964) and Salop (1979), and Mankiw and
Whinston (1986) for detailed analyses of monopolistic or spatial competition, and Katz (1980) for
that case of a multiproduct monopolist; Tirole (1988, chapter 7) offers a good overview of this
literature. More recently, Chen and Riordan (2007) show that the market may again provide too
many or too few products in a spokes model of nonlocalized spatial competition.
7Let Π (),  () and () = Π ()+ () respectively denote industry profit, consumer surplus
and social welfare, and Π and  denote the number of licenses that maximize industry profit and
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bias towards excessive entry,8 and can benefit both consumers and society; restricting
entry can however lead to a number of licenses that is lower than socially desirable, to
an extent such that consumers or society could be be harmed. We explore this issue
using a standard framework of oligopolistic competition with product differentiation,
in which IP owners can sell either fewer or more licenses than is socially desirable.9
Specifically, we adopt the well-known circular city model proposed by Vickrey
(1964) and Salop (1979), in which the number of downstream competitors depends
here on the license fees as well as on entry costs.10 As observed by Spence (1975),
the impact of entry on downstream market price is a key determinant of the desired
number of licenses.11 This market price, in turn, depends on the value of the marginal
consumer served by each downstream firm. Having more downstream firms reduces
transportation costs; as marginal consumers are the ones who benefit most from this,
an integrated monopolist, controlling both the number of downstream outlets and
their prices, would typically wish to have too many outlets.
We first consider, as a benchmark, the case of a single IP owner offering licenses for
a fixed fee, on a non-discriminatory basis. The IP holder faces a trade-off: increasing
the number of licenses enhances product variety, which creates added value; but it
also intensifies downstream competition, which dissipates profits. As a result, the IP
owner may issue either fewer or more licenses than is socially desirable
We then consider the case of two independent owners of complementary and
essential IP. We find that the “patent thicket” reduces variety, as (horizontal) double
social welfare. By a standard revealed argument,  ¡ ¢   ¡Π¢. Thus, whenever Π   ,
consumers necessarily benefit from reducing the number of licenses from Π to  .
8In a different vein, Scotchmer (1991), Green and Scotchmer (1995), and Scotchmer and Menell
(2007) stress that when early investors cannot capture the benefits accruing to subsequent investors,
patent protection for complementary products should be strengthened. A key assumption for this
result is that investment is sequential - different firms invest at different dates.
9The literature on variety has primarily focused on the polar cases of free-entry by mono-product
firms (with either oligopolistic or monopolistic competition) and of a multi-product monopolist; we
revisit this literature by studying instead the case where a few upstream firms (the IP owners) can
affect entry and variety through their licensing terms. Also, while for expositional purposes we
develop our analysis using a particular model of oligopolistic competition, our main insights would
apply in other models where entry can be excessive.
10We will assume that any entry in the downstream market takes place at once and thus ignore
the positive externalities that early adopters may exert on later ones; see Glachant and Meniere
(2010) for an exploration of the role of patents on technology adoption when such externalities are
present.
11Spence focused on quality choice, but the same insight applies to other dimensions such as
variety, which an IP owner can control through the number of licenses.
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marginalization leads to higher access charges and fewer downstream firms than does
monopoly or joint licensing. But making the market less “segmented” also results
in lower consumer prices, and the net effect benefits consumers; it may also increase
social welfare when an IP monopolist (or a patent pool) would sell too many licenses.
Finally, we show that cross-licensing arrangements may alleviate the effect of roy-
alty stacking, whereas vertical integration — namely, the acquisition of a downstream
competitor by an upstream IP holder — does not affect the outcome in our setting.
The literature on IP licensing initially focused on the case of a single owner of
(inessential) innovation that allows a reduction in cost in a downstream market.
Arrow (1962) studied the impact of competition in that downstream market on the
incentives to innovate, while most of the other pioneering work focused on specific
modes of licensing such as the auctioning of a given number of licenses, flat rate
licensing or per unit fees. Katz and Shapiro (1985,1986) focus on the use of flat
rate licensing and study the incentive to share or auction an innovation. Kamien and
Tauman (1986) show that flat rate licensing is indeed more profitable (for non-drastic,
and thus inessential IP) than volume-based royalties in the case of a homogenous
Cournot oligopoly.12 This is partly a consequence of the fact that the licensing
agreement offered to one firm affects its rivals’ profits if they do not buy a license,
and thus their bargaining position vis-à-vis the IP owner; such strategic effects do
not arise in the case of essential (or, in their context, of drastic) innovation, since
firms get no profit if they do not buy a license - whatever the agreements offered to
their rivals. This optimality of flat rate licensing is somewhat at odds with what is
observed in practice. This paradox triggered a number of authors to seek explanations
for the use of royalties. For example, Muto (1993) shows that per unit fees can be
more profitable in the case of Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products;13 Wang
(1998) obtains a similar result in the original context of a Cournot oligopoly when the
IP owner is one of the downstream firms, while Kishimoto and Muto (2012) extend
this insight to Nash Bargaining between an upstream IP owner and downstream firms;
and Sen (2005) shows that lumpiness, too, can provide a basis for the optimality of
volume-based royalties.14
12See Kamien (1992) for an overview of this early literature.
13Hernandez-Murillo and Llobet (2006) consider monopolistic competition with differentiated
products and introduce private information on the value of the innovation for the downstream
firms.
14Faulli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) and Erutku and Richelle (2006) look at two part licensing
policy when there is a differentiated product downstream duopoly and the upstream IP owner is
vertically integrated with one of the downstream firms.
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In a recent paper Schmidt (2008) provides an analysis of the patent thicket prob-
lem that is closely related to ours. He, too, considers a model with upstream IP
owners and downstream competitors needing access to the IP. He finds that, when
licensing agreements involve a simple per unit fee, vertical integration between an
upstream IP owner and a downstream producer solves a “vertical” double mark-up
problem — of successive monopolies — but gives the integrated firm an incentive to
increase the licensing fees charged to others, so as to “raise rivals’ costs”.15 Schmidt
also finds that horizontal integration of IP owners is always beneficial, and reduces
the “horizontal” double mark-up problem of complementary monopolies. While the
model is in many respects more general (e.g., by allowing for more general demand
specifications or alternative forms of oligopolistic competition), it does not consider
the impact of horizontal integration of IP owners or patent pools on downstream
market variety. In contrast, we show that horizontal integration or patent pools are
not always beneficial when accounting for such impact.16
2 Framework
A single upstream firm owns a technology, protected by IP rights. These IP rights
are a key input to be active in a downstream market. In the basic model the IP owner
does not use the technology but licences it instead to downstream competitors; we
subsequently consider the case of multiple, complementary IP owners, and also discuss
the impact of vertical integration.
As mentioned in the introduction, we adopt the circular city model of Vickrey
(1964) and Salop (1979). A mass one of consumers are uniformly distributed along
a circle of length one. A consumer buying from a firm “located” at a distance 
gets a utility  but incurs a “transportation cost” . Any number of firms each
willing to incur a fixed cost  can gain access to the technology and enter the market,
serving consumers at no variable costs. For expositional simplicity, we ignore integer
problems and treat the number of entrants as a continuous variable.
15See also Layne-Farrar and Schmidt (2009).
16For further analyses of the impact of licensing policy and vertical integration on downstream
markets, see e.g. Fosfuri (2006), who stresses that competition among licensors triggers more ag-
gressive licensing, Lerner and Tirole (2005), who study the choice among open licenses, and Rockett
(1990), who notes that the licensor may choose a weak licensee, to avoid tough competition once
the patent expires.
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2.1 Private and social optima
Before studying the impact of access terms on downstream competition, it is useful to
characterize the optimal degree of variety, both from the private standpoint of a fully
integrated company, who would own and control the IP as well as the downstream
firms, and from the social (i.e., total welfare) standpoint.
Lemma 1 The industry is viable if consumers’ reservation price is large enough,
compared with production and transportation costs, namely, if 2  2. In that
case, ignoring divisibility problems, an integrated monopolist would issue  ≡
q 
2
licenses, which is more than the socially desirable number of downstream firms,  ≡q

4 .
Proof. An integrated monopolist would serve the entire market (or none) and
distribute its outlets uniformly along the circle in order to minimize transportation
costs and thus maximize demand. Setting up  outlets then allows the monopolist to
charge  () =  − 
2 , and the resulting profit  ()−  is maximal for  =
q 
2 .
By contrast, total welfare is equal to − ()− , where  () ≡ 2 R 12
0
 = 
4
denotes total transportation costs, and is maximal for  ≡
q

4 .
When deciding whether to add a downstream outlet, an integrated monopolist —
who fully internalizes the entry cost  — focuses on its impact on marginal consumers
(since they are the ones that determine prices), which are those consumers furthest
away from the existing outlets and thus could benefit most from the introduction of
additional outlets. In contrast, total welfare takes into consideration the impact on all
consumers, including inframarginal ones.17 As a result, a fully integrated monopolist
has an incentive to introduce excessively many downstream subsidiaries.
2.2 Downstream competition
We now describe the downstream equilibrium price and profits, assuming that  firms
uniformly distribute themselves along the circle:
Lemma 2 Suppose that  firms are uniformly distributed along the circle. There then
exists a symmetric equilibrium, which is as follows:
•    ≡  (local monopoly): downstream firms charge 
 ≡ 
2
and each obtain
 = 
2
2 −  ; the aggregate profit, consumer surplus and welfare all increase
proportionally to  that range.
17See Spence (1975).
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•    ≡ 3
2

 (Hotelling): the downstream margin reflects the degree of dif-
ferentiation, ; increasing  reduces the resulting Hotelling (aggregate) profit,
Π () ≡ − , and benefits consumers via lower prices and enhanced variety.
•  ≤  ≤  (market segmentation): downstream firms charge the maximal price
that their marginal consumers are willing to pay and the aggregate profit coin-
cides with that of an integrated monopoly, Πˆ () ≡ − 
2 −  ; an increase in allows firms to charge higher prices to their marginal consumers, which more
than offsets the benefit of enhanced variety and reduces consumer surplus.18
Proof. See Salop (1979).19
This simple and well-known discrete choice model is thus flexible enough to reflect
the benefits of variety for consumers, as well as conflicting effects of entry on prices:
when   , entry drives down prices and aggregate profit, whereas when     ,
), through increased market segmentation entry allows instead firms to extract a
bigger share of consumers’ benefit from variety, resulting in higher prices and gross
profits at the expense of consumers).20
2.3 Optimal licensing
Finally, we study the monopoly IP owner’s optimal licensing policy, given its impact
on the downstream market. To fix ideas, we assume that the IP holder charges a fixed
fee  per license (we later discuss alternative licensing arrangements) and consider
the following timing:
• First, the IP owner sets the fee, , for its licenses; this fee is non-discriminatory
and licenses are available to any firm wishing to enter the downstreammarket.21
• Second, potential entrants decide whether to buy a license or not; for the sake
of exposition, we assume that firms entering the market locate themselves uni-
formly along the circle; this minimizes total transportation costs and is thus
desirable for consumers as well as for the upstream firm.
18Consumer surplus is equal to 2 R 2
0
 = 24 for   , to 2 R 12
0
 = 4 for
 ≤  ≤  and to  − 4− ∗ () =  − 54 for   .
19Vickrey (1964) provided the first analysis of the third case.
20The spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) has similar features.
21 Allowing for secret, possibly discriminatory licensing terms might give the IP owner an incentive
to behave opportunistically and issue more licenses than it would otherwise. See Hart and Tirole
(1990), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994), or Rey and Tirole (2007) for
an overview of this literature.
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• Third, licensees compete in prices on the downstream market.
It can be checked that, as  increases, the equilibrium profit of a downstream firm
(gross of the license fee ), ∗ (), first remains constant at the local monopoly level,
 (as long as  remains below ), and then strictly decreases: Πˆ ()  decreases
with  when   , and Π ()  always decreases with . If follows that, by setting
the licensing fee to ∗ () = ∗ (), the IP owner can induce exactly  firms to enter,
and capture all of the donwstream firms’ profits. This upstream IP owner will thus
choose the fee so as to maximize downstream industry profits:
max ∗ () = Π∗ () 
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to  ≥ . Moreover, the IP holder
will never choose   , as Hotelling competition would dissipate profit (Π ()
decreases with ). Thus, the IP holder will never choose   . Over what is the
relevant range [ ], industry profit coincides with the integrated monopoly profit
(Π∗ () = Πˆ ()), which is concave and maximal for  =  . Therefore, the industry
profit is globally quasi-concave and the upstream firm will find it optimal to induce
the entry of Π downstream firms, where
Π ≡ min©  ª 
It can be checked that: (i) the IP holder makes positive profits whenever the industry
is viable (i.e., 2  2); (ii)    if and only if 2  92; and (iii)    if
and only if 2  9. Since    from Lemma (1), we have:22
Proposition 3 Suppose that the market is viable: 2  2; then:
• if 2  9, the IP owner lets too many firms enter the downstream market,
compared with what would be socially desirable;
• if instead 2  9, the IP owner lets too few firms enter the downstream
market.
Thus, when variety is “cheap” (i.e., the fixed cost  is small) and/or “not highly
regarded” (i.e., the transportation cost  is small, implying that variety is not very
22When 2  4, dowstream competition is viable but implementing the welfare optimum
involves    and requires prices below ∗ ¡ ¢ = , so as to keep serving all consumers. The
number of firms that maximizes welfare, given the resulting downtream equilibrium price ∗ (), is
then , which thus exceeds  but remains below Π = .
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valuable) compared with the intrinsic value of the good (as measured by ), the up-
stream IP holder issues too few licences: it would be desirable in that situation to
have more firms in the downstream market, but competition would dissipate the prof-
its that the IP owner can recover. When instead variety is costly and/or particularly
valuable (i.e.,  and  are large), the IP holder issues too many licenses: increasing
variety raises the price that marginal consumers are willing to pay, which then in-
creases industry profit in spite of the increased competition. This ambiguity in the
comparison between the privately and socially desirable numbers of firms reflects a
similar ambiguity for the licensing fees: the IP owner charges an excessively high fee
when 2  9, but charges instead too low a fee when 2  9.
Finally, it can be noted that the IP owner’s inability to fully control the down-
stream firms’ pricing policies limits the risk of excessive entry. In the present set-
up, where a fully integrated industry would generate more variety than is socially
desirable (i.e.,   ), the IP owner’s inability to prevent profit dissipation
through Hotelling-like product market competition tends to limit the number of
downstream firms, which, in turn, reduces the scope for excessive entry (e.g., when
Π    ).
3 Complementary technologies
We now consider a situation where here are two upstream firms, 1 and 2, which
own IP rights. We assume that each upstream firm controls an essential technology
and.that these two technologies are perfect complements: downstream firms require
access to both technologies to be able to compete in the downstream market, and
no downstream firm can even operate without access to both technologies. When
a single firm owns both technologies, or alternatively when the IP owners set-up a
patent pool, the firm or the pool could issue a joint license covering technologies.
Then the analyis of the case of a single IP owner case would apply. We now contrast
the outcome of independent licensing by two IP owners with the case of a single IP
owner or a pool issuing joint licenses.
For this case of two IP holders independently marketing their rights, the timing
of licensing and pricing decisions is adjusted as follows:
• First, each IP owner,  = 1 2, simultaneously and independently sets its license
fee, .
• Second, potential downstream entrants decide whether or not to buy the li-
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censes; as before, those that enter locate themselves uniformly along the circle.
• Third, downstream competitors set their prices.
As already mentioned in the introduction, independent licensing creates a “hori-
zontal” double marginalization problem that leads to higher total fees. It may even
trigger a “coordination breakdown” where both IP owners charge prohibitively high
fees, thereby discouraging any downstream firm from entering the market: indeed,
any pair of fees satisfying 1 2 ≥  constitutes indeed an equilibrium. As such
equilibria rely on weakly dominated strategies, we focus our discussion on equilibria
in which each IP owner charges a fee below the monopoly profit .
Given its rival’s equilibrium fee   ,  can induce the entry of  firms by
setting its own fee to ∗ (), such that
∗ () =  +  (1)
Each  will thus want to choose  (or ) so as to maximize:
Π = ∗ () =  (∗ ()− ) = Π∗ ()− 
We show in the Appendix that the unique equilibrium (excluding weakly dominated
strategies) is symmetric (1 = 2 = , where the superscript  stands for “Double
marginalization”), yields higher (total) fees (i.e., 2  Π), and leads to a number
of firms equal to:
 ≡ 
2
Ãr
1 + 6

2 − 1
!

which is such that  ≤   Π = min©  ª. Comparing the outcomes of inde-
pendent and joint licensing yields:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the market is viable: 2 ≥ 2; then, compared with
single or joint licensing, independent licensing by two IP holders leads to:
• higher upstream fees but lower downstream prices;
• fewer downstream firms and lower industry profits but higher consumer surplus;
• higher (resp., lower) social welfare if 2   = 547 (resp., 2  ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
As expected, double marginalization from independent licensing raises the total
fee charged for a license and thus reduces the number of licenses that are issued.
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Compared with joint licensing, this can only reduce industry profit. The impact of
this royalty stacking on social welfare is less clear-cut. To be sure, it is undesirable
when too few licenses would be issued under joint licensing (that is, when 2  9
from Proposition 3). When instead, joint licensing generates excessive entry, double
marginalization counters this bias and can enhance welfare. In particular, indepen-
dent licensing is always beneficial when these IP owners would still issue too many
licenses (which is indeed the case when 2  254), as double marginalization then
brings the number of licenses closer to the social optimum (since Π     ).
In the intermediate range (that is, when 254  2  9), royalty stacking reduces
variety more than is socially desirable but still enhances welfare as long as it does
not “overshoot,” i.e., for 2 below the threshold level,  = 547.
As royalty stacking always reduces industry profits, it must benefit consumers
whenever it enhances welfare. More surprisingly, independent licensing always ben-
efits consumers — when royalty stacking reduces welfare, it is not by harming con-
sumers, but by hurting profits more than benefitting consumers. To understand why
independent licensing benefits consumers, note first that under joint licensing, the
IP owners always seek to avoid standard Hotelling competition because it dissipates
(aggregate) profits, and thus issue fewer than  licences. Therefore, the IP owners
never issue so many licenses as to leave marginal consumers with a positive surplus.
By reducing downstream variety, independent licensing benefits (infra-marginal) con-
sumers, and increases consumer surplus Consumers may even prefer this double
marginalization situation to royalty-free licenses, unless the royalty-free equilibrium
results in significantly more than  firms.23
4 Extensions and discussion
We consider here alternative organizations and market structures. We first show
that cross-licensing agreements can be a substitute for joint licensing and solve dou-
ble marginalization problems. We then note that vertical integration appears to
have little impact on the equilibrium outcome in this model. Finally, we discuss the
23Consumer surplus decreases with  in the range [ ] and then increases with  for   . Let
denote by  the number of downstream firms when licenses are free (i.e., such that ∗ ¡¢ = 0)
and by ˆ   the number of firms that yields as much surplus as . Then, as long as  ≤ ˆ
(that is, when  is “large enough”), the outcome of IP duopoly and double marginalization is better
for consumers than the free-entry equilibrium — in that case, the number of firms that maximize
consumer surplus, subject to non-negative profit constraint, is ; when   ˆ, however, consumers
would prefer to have “as many firms” as possible and free-entry would work better for them.
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robustness of our insights to alternative royalty schemes.
4.1 Cross-licensing
The IP holders could instead opt for cross-licensing agreements, allowing them to
issue “complete” licenses covering both technologies, subject to one IP owner paying
the other a unit fee for each license the IP owner issues to a downstream firm. Suppose
first the IP holders enter into a reciprocal cross-licensing agreement allowing each of
them to issue complete licenses, by paying the other a fee equal to . As we show
in Appendix B, as long as the reciprocal fee  is not too large (namely,  ≤ ),
Bertrand competition between the two upstream firms leads them to set their fees
(for complete licenses) to
Φ1 = Φ2 = Φ ≡ 2
Each  is then indifferent between issuing a license and earning Φ −  = , or
letting the other IP holder issue the license and earning . (If   , implying
   (), the IP owners would instead have an incentive to undercut each other).
Clearly, as long as this equilibrium prevails, it is optimal for the IP holders to adjust
the upstream cross-licensing fee  to Π2, so as to drive the downstream licensing fee
Φ = 2 to Π and share the integrated monopoly profit. Conversely, Π   ensures
that Π2  , implying that setting  to Π2 indeed yields the desired outcome.
Such a cross-licensing arrangement thus formally achieves the same outcome as a
merger or patent pool.
If instead each  independently sets its upstream fee , then cross-licensing can
again mitigate double marginalization problems but does not eliminate them entirely:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the two IP holders enter into a cross-licensing agree-
ment, allowing them to issue complete licenses for the technology by paying the other
an upstream fee per license issued; then:
• by agreeing on a reciprocal upstream the IP holders achieve the same outcome
as under joint licensing;
• if instead the IP holders set their upstream fees independently, there are multiple
equilibria, with a number of downstream firms lying in
£ ¤, where  
  Π.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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4.2 Vertical integration
Vertical integration has little impact here, whatever the number of IP owners. To
see this, note first that vertical integration: (i) does not change the profit function,
and therefore has no effect on the behavior of non-integrated downstream firms; and
(ii) does not affect the behavior of the subsidiary either since, once it has sold its
licenses, the variable profit of an integrated firm coincides with that of its downstream
subsidiary. Therefore, as before, a total licensing fee  () = ∗ () will again induce
the entry of exactly  downstream competitors (integrated or not).
When the integrated firm is the sole IP holder, it then wants to set  so as to
maximize:
∗ () + (− 1) () = ∗ () 
and again chooses to let Π firms (including its own subsidiary) enter the downstream
market.
When instead there is another IP holder, who sets a licensing fee , the integrated
IP holder  will again seek to let  firms so as to maximize:
∗ ()−  + ( − 1) (∗ ()− ) = Π∗ ()− 
and thus its licensing behavior is thus the same as if it was not integrated. As a result,
the equilibrium outcome is the same, whether the IP holders are vertically integrated
or not. The same reasoning applies to both IP holders when they are each integrated
with a single distinct downstream subsidiary. We thus have:
Proposition 6 Vertical integration by one or more IP holders, each with a single
downstream firm, does not affect the equilibrium outcome.
The neutrality of vertical integration relies here on the fact that the final demand
is inelastic (and in equilibrium the IP holder has always an incentive to issue suffi-
ciently many licenses to cover the market). As Schmidt (2008) observed, when the
final demand is elastic, vertical integration can alleviate (vertical) double mark-up
problems, enhancing coordination between upstream and downstream pricing deci-
sions within the integrated firm, as well as providing the integrated IP owner an
incentive to increase its licensing (unit) fees, in order to “raise rivals’ costs” and ben-
efit from the resulting foreclosure effect;24 vertical integration may also allow the IP
24See Ordover, Salop and Saloner (1990) and Salinger (1988). More recently, Allain, Chambolle
and Rey (2011) show that vertical integration can discourage downstream innovation when down-
stream firms must exchange sensitive information with their suppliers in order to implement an
innovation.
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owner to better exert its market power,25 or induce the downstream subsidiary to
become less aggressive.26
Remark: Joint licensing. Proposition 6 extends to joint licensing. If for example
a pool sets the licensing fee  and redistributes half of the profit to each IP owner,
the pool manager will pick the total number of firms  (by setting  = ∗ ()) so as
to maximize:
∗ () + (− 2)
2
= ∗ () + (− 2) 
∗ ()
2
=
∗ ()
2
=
Π∗ ()
2

The pool manager thus again maximizes total profits and chooses  = Π.
4.3 Alternative licensing arrangements
The IP holders could better control price and variety through the use of more com-
plex licensing arrangements. For example, in the absence of informational problems,
two-part tariffs would generally allow an upstream monopolist to replicate the fully
integrated monopoly outcome. Similarly, more sophisticated licensing schemes than
the fixed licensing fees considered above could help the IP holders to overcome double
marginalization problems. In a previous version of the paper,27 we showed that in
our simple setting per unit fees actually suffice to avoid double marginalization prob-
lems and achieve the fully monopoly outcome — whether the IP holders are vertically
integrated or not; by contrast, royalty percentages based on (variable) profits still
give rise to some double marginalization problems.
5 Conclusion
Patent thickets have long been a concern due to the potential for delaying product
deployment and adversely affecting consumers. We examine the implications of such
patent thickets for downstream market structure and product variety as well as prices
and welfare. In the absence of vertical licensing agreements, it is well known that
there can be excessive entry, due e.g. to business stealing effects, or insufficient entry,
25In case of secret contracting, vertical integration may help limiting the risk of opportunistic
behavior that would otherwise lead the IP owner to issue too many licenses (see See Hart and
Tirole (1990) and the discussion in footnote 21), since issuing an additional license then hurts the
integrated subsidiary as well as the other downstream competitors.
26See Chen (2001), who stresses that the downstream subsidiary will internalize the impact of its
behavior on the sales of the integrated supplier.
27See Rey and Salant (2010).
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if firms entering the market appropriate only part of the surplus they generate. We
revisit this issue, taking into account the gatekeeper role that upstream IP owners play
through their licensing policies, and show that royalty stacking can play a beneficial
role for consumers and society in situations of excessive variety.
We adopt a standard horizontal differentiation framework and first consider the
case in which a single owner of essential IP controls entry in the downstream market
and can appropriate the resulting profits through licensing fees. The IP holder inter-
nalizes any business stealing effect, and can choose to sell a larger or smaller number
of licenses than is socially optimal. Granting too many licenses occurs when variety is
particularly valuable or very costly, in which case issuing additional licensees allows
the IP to extract a larger share of the surplus that consumers derive from enhanced
variety. When instead downstream products are close substitutes, competition dissi-
pates profits and the IP holder tends to issue too few licenses or, equivalently, charges
too high fees for these licenses.
When there are two or more upstream IP owners, royalty stacking reduces both
the number of licensees and industry profits but, by limiting market segmentation,
it also leads to lower prices and higher consumer surplus. Independent licensing can
also enhance social welfare, except if it excessively limits the number of licenses, in
which case profits fall by more than consumer benefits increase, and social welfare is
reduced.
As royalty stacking always reduces IP holders’ profits, they have an incentive to
develop licensing arrangements, such as patent pools or cross-licensing agreements,
that allow them to solve the double marginalization problems. We also show that, as
vertical integration does not alter the behavior of affiliated downstream subsidiaries,
it has no effect on the equilibrium outcome and thus does not affect our analysis.
Finally, we discuss the robustness of our insights to alternative types of licensing
schemes, such as per-unit fees or profit-based royalties.
Products offered in high technology industries are often quite differentiated and
embody the (sometimes extensive) patent portfolios of a few firms. Our analysis
indicates that royalty stacking in such industries may have a more ambiguous impact
than the patent thicket literature suggests.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 4
Given the two IP owners’ fees 1 and 2, the number of downstream firms entering
the market is given by ∗ (1 + 2), where
∗ () ≡
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(∗)−1 () when   
any  ≤  when  = 
0 when   
Each  then obtains a profit equal to
Π = ∗ (1 + 2)
As already noted, independent licensing may trigger a “coordination breakdown”,
where both IP owners charge fees higher than the monopoly profit  and no down-
stream firm enters the market. These equilibria however involve weakly dominated
strategies, and we now focus instead on equilibria in which both upstream firms
charge a fee lower than .
Fix the rival’s fee    and suppose first that  considers inducing a number
   of downstream firms, by setting a fee  such that + = ∗ () =  ();
 would then rather increase  in order to reduce  to , since its profit, given by
Π =  = 
¡ ()− ¢ = Π ()− 
decreases in  (since Π () decreases in ). Therefore,  will never issue more than
 licenses. Similarly, setting  = − induces any  ≤  firms to enter and gives
 a profit
Π =  ¡ − ¢ 
which is positive and proportional to the number of firms; hence  will never issue
less than  licences.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that  sets a fee  such that
 +  ∈ [ ], where
 ≡ ∗ () = 4
2
9 − 
so as to induce a number of firms  ∈ [ ], given by + = ∗ () = ˆ (), that
maximizes
Π =  = 
¡ˆ ()− ¢ = Πˆ ()−  =  − 2 −  ¡ + ¢  (2)
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Ignoring the constraint  ∈ [ ] would lead  to choose
 =  ¡ + ¢ =s 
2
¡ + ¢  (3)
which is larger than  when  ≤  and is also smaller than  as long as
 ≥ ˆ ≡ 2
2
9 − 
where ˆ   and ˆ  0 is equivalent to    . Therefore:
• if    , ’s best response to  ≤  is to induce a number of firms equal
to  for  ≤ ˆ and to 
¡ + ¢ otherwise, where  ( + ) denotes the
integrated monopoly outcome for a fixed cost equal to  +  instead of  ; the
corresponding fee is then  = 
¡¢, where  () is defined by:
 () ≡
(
 −  when  ≤ ˆ
ˆ ¡ ( + )¢−  when ˆ ≤  ≤ 
• if  ≥  , ’s best response to  ≤  is always to induce a number of firms
 =  ( + ) with a fee equal to ˆ
¡ ¡ + ¢¢− .
In both cases, in the range  ∈ [0 ] the resulting number of firms is  () ≡
min
©  ( + )ª, which weakly decreases from Π to  as  increases, whereas
the best response  is continuous and decreases from  (0) = Π to  () = 0:
the slope is equal to −1 for   ˆ and, for   ˆ, using
ˆ ¡ ( + )¢−  = q 
2(+)
− 
2 
2(+)
− ( + ) = √
p
2 ( + )− 2 ( + ) 
we have: 
 () =
√
1p
2 ( + ) − 2 = 
 ( + )   − 2
where  ( + ) decreases from 3
2

 to

 as  increases from ˆ to ; the slope
thus lies between −12 and −1. Therefore, the best responses  = 
¡¢, for
 6=  = 1 2, cross once and only once in the range [0 ]. Therefore, there is
unique equilibrium in this range, which is moreover symmetric: 1 = 2 =  and
1 = 2 = . Furthermore, since − 2ˆ =   0, we have − ˆ  ˆ, as illustrated
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by Figure 1; the equilibrium thus satisfies   ˆ and   , and is therefore
characterized by:
 =  ¡ + ¢ =s 
2
¡ + ¢ and 2 = ˆ ¡¢ = 1
µ
 − 
2
¶
− 
These two conditions imply:
22 = − 22 = − 
2
− 2
and thus:
2 + − 3
2
= 0 (4)
which has a unique non-negative solution:
 ≡ 
2
Ãr
1 +
6
2 − 1
!

m
1 = R)
2 = R1)
2
m
1
D
D

Figure 1: Best response fees for complementary technologies
It is straightforward to confirm that double marginalization leads to fewer licenses
being issued. This is obvious in the case of coordination breakdown, where no license
is issued; and when the upstream firms coordinate on the above equilibrium,   ˆ
implies  =  ¡¢   (0) = Π.
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This reduction in the number of licenses can only be socially harmful when too
few licenses would be issued even under joint licensing, that is, when 2  9.
Conversely, it can only enhance welfare when too many licenses remain issued un-
der independent licensing (implying Π     , so that independent licens-
ing brings the number of licenses closer to the social optimum), which is the case
when 2  254. In the intermediate range (that is, when 254  2  9),
royalty stacking counterbalances IP owners’ bias towards excessive variety and can
thus enhance welfare provided it does not “overshoot”. Since Π =  in that range
(  Π =  when 2  92, and 254  92), independent licensing is socially
beneficial when welfare is higher with  than with , that is, when:
 − 
4 − 
 = 
12
Ã
17− 7
r
1 +
6
2
!
  − 
4 −  =

6
µ
5− 92
¶

which boils down to 2  , where  = 547 lies indeed between 254 and 9.
B Proof of Proposition 5
We analyze here the situation where the upstream firms allow each other to license
their own technology. We will denote by  the (upstream) fee that  charges to
 for each license it issues, and by Φ the (downstream) fee charged by  for a
“complete” license covering both technologies. The timing is as follows:
• first, the IP owners set the upstream fees 1 and 2 (more on this below);
• second, the IP owners set their downstream fees Φ1 and Φ2;28 the downstream
firms then decide whether to buy a license and enter the market.
We first characterize the continuation equilibria of the second stage, for given
upstream fees 1 and 2. We then consider two scenarios for the first stage: in the
first scenario, the IP owners jointly agree on a reciprocal fee 1 = 2 = ; in the
second scenario, the two IP owners sets their fees simultaneously and independently.
B.1 Competition on complete licenses
We take here the upstream fees 1 and 2 as given and consider the second stage,
where the two IP owners charge fees Φ1 and Φ2 for “complete” licenses; downstream
28Each IP owner could also offer partial licenses, covering its own IP, at a fee ; for the sake of
exposition, we will assume that they only offer “complete” licenses — the resulting equilibria can be
supported by setting 1 2  .
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entrants then buy a license from the cheapest licensor and, given Φ = min {Φ1Φ2},
the number of entrants is equal to ∗ (Φ).
Note first that each  is unwilling to sell a complete license for a fee Φ lower than
’s upstream fee . Therefore, if min {1 2}  , then no license is issued and
both IP owners get zero profit. If min {1 2} = , there are multiple continuation
equilibria, in which the upstream firms set downstream fees exceeding  or serve up
to  licences at a fee Φ = , thereby sharing up to .
We now turn to the case min {1 2}   and consider first a candidate equi-
librium where Φ1 = Φ2 = Φ. Each  can then obtain  (Φ) by increasing its fee
Φ (letting the other IP owner sell its license to all downstream entrants) and can
also obtain  (Φ) ¡Φ− ¢ by slightly undercutting its rival. Therefore, it must be
the case that Φ = 1+2. Conversely, Φ1 = Φ2 = 1+2 constitutes an equilibrium
as long as no  benefits from undercutting its rival, which is the case when
Φ  1 + 2 =⇒ ∗ (Φ)
¡Φ − ¢  ∗ (1 + 2)
or, using  ≡ Φ −  as the decision variable, when
   =⇒ ∗
¡ + ¢  ∗ ¡ + ¢ (5)
Since the profit function ∗ ¡ + ¢ is strictly quasi-concave in 29 and maximal
for  = 
¡¢, (5) boils down to  ≤  ¡¢; this symmetric equilibrium thus
exists when 1 ≤  (2) and 2 ≤  (1) (implying 1 2  , see Figure 1).
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which Φ  Φ, implying that the two
IP owners obtain respectively (posing  = Φ − ):
Π = ∗ (Φ) ¡Φ − ¢ = ∗ ¡ + ¢
Π = ∗ (Φ) = ∗
¡ + ¢
 should not be able to gain from small deviations, which implies  = 
¡¢ (and
thus Φ = Φ ¡¢,  =  ¡¢), and should not gain either from letting  sell at
Φ, which requires Π =  ¡¢ ¡¢ ≥ ∗ (Φ); Φ must therefore be “large
enough” (any Φ  , for which ∗ (Φ) = 0, would do). In addition,  should not
gain from undercutting , that is:
Π =  ¡¢ ≥ maxΦ≤Φ()∗ (Φ) (Φ− )  (6)
29It coincides with the industry profit, which is strictly concave, when + ∈ [ ], drops to
zero when  +    (and lies anywhere between 0 and  when  +  = ), and is equal
to Π ¡∗ ¡ + ¢¢ when  +   , in which case it strictly increases with .
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As already noted, the profit function ∗ (Φ) (Φ− ) = ∗
¡ + ¢ is quasi-
concave in Φ, and it is maximal for Φ = Φ (). Therefore:
• if    (which implies Φ ()  Φ
¡¢),30 condition (6) (setting Φ =
Φ ¡¢ in the right-hand side) boils down to  ≥  ¡¢:
 ¡¢ ≥  ¡¢ ¡Φ ¡¢− ¢
⇐⇒  ≥ Φ
¡¢− 
⇐⇒  ≥ Φ
¡¢−  =  ¡¢ ;
• if  ≤  (and thus Φ () ≤ Φ
¡¢), condition (6) amounts to (setting
Φ = Φ () in the right-hand side)
Πˆ ¡¢ ≡  ¡¢ ≥ Π () ≡  () ¡Φ ()− ¢ =  () () 
where by construction the profit function Π () = max ∗ ( + ) decreases
with , whereas the profit function Πˆ () =  () increases with .31
Thus condition (6) requires  to be higher than some threshold ˆ (), which
decreases as  increases. Furthermore, for  = 
¡¢ we have:
Πˆ ¡¢ = ∗ ¡ +  ¡¢¢ ≤ Π ¡ ¡¢¢ = max ∗ ¡+  ¡¢¢
with an equality only if  =  () = 
¡ ¡¢¢, that is, if  = ; it
follows that the threshold function ˆ () lies above
¡¢−1 () (and coincides
with it only for  =  = ), as shown in Figure 2 below.
Building on these insights, we have, assuming without loss of generality that
 ≤  (see Figure 2):
• If  ≤ 
¡¢, there is a unique, symmetric continuation equilibrium, Φ1 =
Φ2 = 1 + 2; each  then obtains:
Π = ∗ (1 + 2)
30Φ () =  +  (), where the slope of  () has been shown to exceed −1.
31This is obvious for   ˆ, as  () =  is constant in that range; and for   ˆ, we have:
Πˆ () =  ( + ) =
s

2 ( + ) =
s 
2


 + 1

which also increases with .
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• If   
¡¢, then there is an asymmetric continuation equilibrium in which
 charges a prohibitively high fee while  sells  ¡¢ complete licenses at a
fee Φ ¡¢; the two IP owners then obtain respectively:
 = Π ¡¢   = Πˆ ¡¢ 
where Π () and Πˆ () respectively decrease and increase with .
• If in addition   ˆ
¡¢, there is another asymmetric continuation equilib-
rium, in which the roles of the two IP owners are reversed.
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Figure 2: Competition for complete licenses
B.2 First stage of IP interaction
We now turn to the first stage and start with the scenario where the two IP owners
jointly determine a reciprocal upstream fee 1 = 2 = . By setting this fee to:
Π ≡ 
∗ ¡Π¢
2

they can ensure that the second stage leads to Φ1 = Φ2 = ∗ ¡Π¢ and thus to the
entry of Π downstream firms, and share equally the profit that an integrated IP
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owner could generate. In the light of the above analysis, it suffices to note that  
Π implies  = ∗ ¡¢ 2  Π = ∗ ¡Π¢ 2, which in turn implies Π   ¡Π¢.
Finally, consider the alternative scenario where the two IP owners set their up-
stream fees simultaneously and independently. It is easy to check that (see Figure
2):
• There is no equilibrium in which 1   (2) and 2   (1): in the unique
continuation equilibrium, each  would obtain a profit Π = ∗ (1 + 2)
and would thus deviate and increase its fee.
• There is no equilibrium in which  ¡¢ ≤   ˆ ¡¢: in the unique
continuation equilibrium,  would then obtain a profit Π =  ¡¢, which
increases with , and would thus deviate and increase its fee.
• There is no equilibrium in which     : in the unique continuation
equilibrium,  would then obtain a profit Π =  ¡¢, which increases
with , and would thus deviate and increase its fee.
• There is no equilibrium in which    and  ≥ : in the unique continu-
ation equilibrium,  would then obtain zero profit, whereas setting e.g.  to³
ˆ
´−1 ¡¢ would yield instead Π ()  0.
Let us now focus on candidate equilibria where 1 ≥ ˆ (2), 2 ≥ ˆ (1), and
1 2 ≤ . In this region, there are two continuation equilibria, one () in which
 sells at Φ ¡¢ and earns Π ¡¢ whereas  earns Πˆ ¡¢, and another one
() in which the roles are reversed. Suppose without loss of generality that  ≥ 
(which, in this region, implies  ≥ ); then:
• There is no equilibrium in which    and the continuation equilibrium is
, where  6=  ∈ {1 2}: , which then obtains Π () (where  6=  ∈
{1 2}), could profitably deviate by choosing instead ˜ =  ()
³
 ˆ ()
´
,
as it would then earn
Πˆ
³
˜
´
= 
³
˜
´
˜ = 
¡ ()¢ ()  Π () =  () () 
where the inequality stems from the fact that    implies    ()
and thus  ¡ ()¢   ().
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• The above argument rules out any equilibrium configuration such that  ≥
  ; furthermore, when instead  ≥  ≥ , the only possible continu-
ation equilibrium is , in which  obtains Π ¡¢ and  obtains Πˆ ¡¢.
Conversely, this indeed constitutes an equilibrium, assuming that any deviation
by , for  = 1 2, is followed by the continuation equilibrium  whenever it
exists. Indeed, in that case:
— Deviating gives  either the same profit Π ¡¢ if  ≥  ¡¢, or a
lower profit ∗ ¡ + ¢ if    ¡¢.
— Reducing the upstream fee  does not allow  to alter its profit, whereas
raising it triggers a switch to the other continuation equilibrium , giving
 a (weakly) lower profit:
Π () =  () () ≤ Πˆ
¡¢ =  ¡¢
where the inequality stems from  ≥   ˆ ()
¡≥  ()¢ implies
 () ≤ 
¡¢ and  ≥  ().
• The equilibrium that generates the greater joint profit,  ()
¡ +  ()¢ =
 ()Φ () is the one for which  is the lowest, and thus for which  is
maximal:  =  and  such that 
¡¢ ¡¢ = . This equilibrium
gives IP owners a larger total profit than the “double marginalization” outcome
but only one IP owner benefits from it:    indeed implies:
Π = Π ¡¢  Π = Π ¡¢ = Πˆ ¡¢  Π = Πˆ ¡¢ 
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